Foreword

[xi] Few of man's technological endeavors compare in scope of significance to the development of the Saturn family of launch vehicles.

At the time of this writing in 1979, we may still be too close to the project to see it objectively from the perspective of history, but I expect that future historians will compare the development of Saturn to such great and imaginative projects as the building of the Panama Canal and to such latter-day technological achievements as the Manhattan Project. In terms of both vision and achievement, Saturn may surpass them all.

It was as if the Wright Brothers had gone from building their original Wright Flyer in 1903 to developing a supersonic Concorde in 1913. Unimaginable; yet in 10 short years the builders of Saturn progressed from the small, single-engine rockets like Redstone to the giant vehicle with clustered engines that put man on the moon. Our Earth-to-orbit weight-lifting capability grew in that decade by 10 thousand times.

Saturn was an engineering masterpiece. The ultimate Saturn, taller than the Statue of Liberty, had a takeoff weight that exceeded that of 25 fully loaded jet airliners, and produced as much power as 85 Hoover Dams.

The Saturn program was also a masterpiece of management. There are those who hold that one of the principal benefits this country derived from the Apollo-Saturn lunar landing program was the development of a new and extraordinary management approach through which the National Aeronautics and Space Administration directed vast human and material resources toward a common purpose. The system that was developed to meet the incredible complexities of the program, taking account of its pioneering nature and the time constraint imposed, provides a pattern for managing a broad spectrum of future technological, scientific, and social endeavors.

One of the most remarkable things about the Saturn program was its success rate. An early press release openly stated that because of the [xii] complexity of the system and the tremendous advancement in technology required, program officials fully expected half of the 10 Saturn I's launched to fail. None did. Neither did any Saturn 1B, nor did any Saturn V, either test vehicle or operational rocket-and there were 32 Saturn launches in all.

The reliability assessment of the system was such that only two Saturn Vs were launched before the third sent Frank Borman's crew around the moon during Christmas of 1968. In all, 27 men went around the moon aboard Saturn-launched space vehicles, 12 actually walked on its surface.

Close on the heels of the lunar landing series, NASA developed Skylab, the world's first major laboratory in which we could operate experiments in the new environment of space. The Saturn again played a pivotal role in this enterprise-the core component of the Skylab itself being a modified Saturn stage. Only a Saturn V could lift the huge laboratory into orbit, which, when an Apollo spacecraft was annexed, weighed 100 metric tons and was 36 meters long. The three crews, which inhabited the space station for a total time of nearly six months, were launched on the smaller Saturn IBs. The Saturn family made Skylab possible, so Saturn deserves a large share of the credit for the mission's success in establishing a broad foundation of scientific and technological knowledge.

Furthermore, we should not overlook the role Saturn played in the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project of 1975. It was another Saturn IB that carried an American crew to its historic rendezvous with two Soviet cosmonauts in orbit. The reliable Saturn gave NASA every confidence that its crew could ascend on schedule following the Soviet launch half a world away and make the time-critical union of those two small objects in space. We had a high level of confidence that this, the last Saturn, would perform with the same excellence as its 31 predecessors. It did not disappoint us.

It should be pointed out that the Apollo-Saturn program was a national achievement. It has been estimated that 20 000 private firms and 300 000 people participated in the development of this system. The challenge taxed American ingenuity to the extreme. The result, of course, was that American technology made the "giant leap" referred to by Neil Armstrong. Whole new industries were born, offering products that touch our everday lives in ways we could not have dreamed of just a decade before.

We may not soon again face a challenge to match the lunar landing, and it may be some time before we mount the kind of scientific and engineering effort that gave us Saturn. Whenever that next challenge comes, we have in the Apollo-Saturn program the basic blueprint for achieving success. It not only will point the way but will also give the confidence needed to undertake new and dramatic challenges.

[xiii] Among the other lessons learned from the development of Saturn is the evidence of how much a free society can do and how far a dedicated people can go when they are properly challenged, led, motivated, and supported.

This is Our legacy from Saturn.



June 1979

William R. Lucas

Director, George C. Marshall
Space Flight Center

Preface

[xv] The gigantic Saturn V launch vehicle may well be the first and last of its kind. Subsequent space ventures will be based on new vehicles, such as the smaller, reusable Space Shuttle. Manned launches in the near future will be geared to orbital missions rather than planetary excursions, and unmanned deep-space missions will not demand the very high thrust boosters characteristic of the Apollo program. As the space program moves into the future, it also appears that the funding for elaborate "big booster" missions will not be forthcoming for NASA. The Saturn V class of launch vehicles are the end of the line of the Saturn generation. It is not likely that anything like them will ever be built again.

Because of the commanding drama of the awesome Saturn V, it is easy to forget the first Saturn-the Saturn I and Saturn IB. This history is an attempt to give due credit to these pioneering vehicles, to analyze the somewhat awkward origins of the Saturn I as a test bed for static testing only, not as an operational vehicle, and to discuss the uprated Saturn IB as an interim booster for the orbital testing of the first Apollo capsules. Evolution of the engines is also given considerable space early in the narrative. Because the Apollo-Saturn program was expected to put a man on the moon within a fixed time span, the use of available hardware was particularly attractive-an aspect of the program that is not generally appreciated by the public. The development of the early Saturn I and IB vehicles, as well as the engines, illustrates this approach. Inevitably, the unique nature of the mission called for advances in the state of the art, and the Saturn history includes some examples. One outstanding example is the development of high-energy liquid hydrogen engines. Other examples include the development of insulation for extended storage of large quantities of hydrogen in vehicle tanks and the advances in the computer technology of the guidance and control systems.

The development of Saturn was enormously expensive and time- consuming. Even given the expected costs of developments to advance the state of the art, why were the costs of the development time so great if [xvi] the program still relied so much on existing hardware? Part of the answer involves the uniqueness of dimensions. Even a proven component, to be used in the huge Saturn, had to be scaled up in size. The larger component had to withstand a similar increase in the amount of punishment inflicted on it, and this fact opened up a whole new regime of operational headaches. The scaling up of components and systems for lunar missions seemed to involve geometrical progressions rather than simple arithmetic progressions. The F-1 engines for the S-IC first stage graphically illustrate this difficulty. The size of the Saturn stages and engines also called for enlargement of test stands and other facilities, with attendant increases in time and costs. The logistical challenge assumed gargantuan proportions. The managers of the Apollo-Saturn programs also discovered unanticipated expenses in storing and maintaining exotic hardware that was subject to degradation unless constantly monitored, refurbished, and attended by additional cadres of technicians.

This book is a technological history. To many contemporaries the narrative may read too much like a technical manual, but the author's concern is for posterity, when the technical manuals may be lost or dispersed (as many are already) and knowledgeable participants have long since died. The narrative approach was largely predicated on questions that might well be asked by future generations: How were the Saturns made? How did they work? Two other histories, already published, deal with subjects keyed to the Apollo-Saturn program: (1) the development of the Apollo command and service modules along with the lunar module, and (2) the construction and operation of launch facilities at Cape Kennedy. These books contain much of the political and administrative struggles surrounding the origins and development of the Apollo program, and it would be redundant to retell the whole story for the Saturn history. I have therefore included only the background that seemed necessary to put the Saturn in proper perspective, and Part Two recapitulates the programmatic and administrative origins of Saturn. The bulk of the text is devoted to the theme of technological development. Even chapter 9, on management, is geared to the specifics of the technological management of Saturn vehicles.

The decision to treat the history of the Saturn program as a technological narrative shaped the nature of all sections of the book. So that some of the innovations and advances might be appreciated, it seemed advisable to include a brief historical overview of rocket technology. Against this background, I hope the Saturn story will stand out with greater clarity.

The narrative itself is organized into seven parts. The question was how to deal with the complexity of many simultaneous programs during the Saturn development that involved the various engines, stages, and associated equipment for three separate launch vehicles. A strict chronological organization seemed unnecessarily confusing. The topical approach, [xvii] although constructed in a loose chronological sequence, provided the opportunity to deal with the early technology involved in Saturn I and Saturn IB launch vehicles primarily in terms of the concept of clustering tanks and engines. The engines themselves, although they possessed inherent differences, evolved out of common principles of engine design and cryogenic technology. Dealing with these propulsion systems as a separate unit made the significance of their development stand out more clearly. Similarly, I analyzed the evolution of rocket stages as a unit and emphasized propellant tankage for the Saturn V vehicle. Although many early Saturn flights were concurrent with the research and development phases, all the launches are summarized in two chapters toward the end of the book. Just as the flights were the culmination of Apollo-Saturn, discussion of them all at the end of the narrative seemed logical.

The manned operations involving the spacecraft-the activities of the launch crews at liftoff-the role of the astronauts-these events involved discrete numbers of human actors. The inherent drama in launches and missions tended to spotlight the people involved. On the other hand, development of the Saturn launch vehicle rested on millions of hours of prior research and development and on thousands of designers, engineers, technicians, and specialists who worked behind the scenes. It was often impossible to single out a specific individual responsible for a specific achievement because most of the major decisions and breakthroughs resulted from elaborate team efforts. In fact, one veteran of the Marshall Space Flight Center told me that he preferred that the Saturn history not mention people at all. It was too hard, he explained, to isolate significant achievements without mentioning dozens of people who made successful contributions,

The launch vehicle, as dramatic as it was during liftoff, played a minor role in the total duration of a mission. It was visible to observers for only eight minutes or so as it blazed into orbit. The personnel of Houston's Mission Control and the astronaut crew occupied center stage for the lion's share of the lunar mission. For all the spectacular effects of the Saturn vehicle's awesome launch, most of the Saturn story deals with many years of unglamorous research, development, and test. It is a story of prior work: of nuts, bolts, and pyrotechnics-and that is the story I have tried to tell in these pages.



June 1979
R.E.B.
Houston

大爱土五~~[s:319][s:316]

机械翻译来了
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX/SP-4206/XXXXXXXXXXXm

sp - 4206土星阶段
土星5号的各级(各阶段?)

内容
第一页总目录NASA原网页中每个条目都是可点击的链接

到

沃纳·冯·布劳恩
1912 - 1977

和男性和女性
谁建造了土星

土星五号火箭的图片在发射台



前言。
前言。
鸣谢。

即序言。

1。的概念和起源。

二世。土星建筑;街区。

2。航空航天字母:ABMA,ARPA,所有。

3。任务模式,和制造业。

三世。火,烟,雷霆:引擎。

4。传统的低温学:h - 1和f - 1。

5。非传统的低温学:rl 10和j 2。

四。建筑土星V。

6。从年代iv的S-IVB。

7。下阶段:s ic和年代ll。

8。从付款到发射:典型的计算机。

诉协调:男人和机器。

9。管理土星。

10。物流混乱。

六世。一步一步。

11。排位赛集群的概念。

12。巨大的飞跃。

七世。结语。

13。遗产


附录A -图式的土星V。
附录B -土星五号发射前的——启动顺序。
附录C -土星飞行历史。
附录D -土星研发资金、历史。
附录E -土星V承包商。
附录F -位置的剩余,土星的硬件。
附录G -美国宇航局组织在阿波罗土星。
附录H -所有人员在,阿波罗土星。

笔记。
来源和研究材料。
指数。
作者。


-插图——



标题页-土星V在lc 39。
七个照片的阿波罗11号任务。
罗伯特·戈达德的照片。
德国火箭先驱的照片。
四个照片在美国早期的火箭
沃纳·冯·布劳恩第一七名宇航员。
推出的艾伦·谢泼德在水星红石。
规模比较美国载人航天飞行器。
土星的发展概念。
土星与汞红石我朱诺II。
艾森豪威尔总统与第一美国宇航局局长t·基斯Glennan和副管理员休·德莱顿。
沃纳·冯·布劳恩和他的ABMA高级职员。
艾森豪威尔总统致力于乔治c .马歇尔太空飞行中心。
安西尔弗斯坦参观火箭设施。
两个总结图表从西尔弗斯坦报告。
早期版本的土星c 1和c - 5。
美国国家航空航天局发射车辆的稳定。
约翰Houbolt和月球轨道交会。
肯尼迪总统在所有。
所有的四个航拍。
Michoud操作和密西西比州的照片测试设备。
土星我设计和制造。
土星IB的设计和制造。
土星引擎的应用。
涡轮泵为h - 1发动机。
细节和系统的h - 1发动机。
点火和制造的h - 1发动机。
细节和图式的f - 1发动机。
发动机启动序列的年代集成电路阶段。
f - 1发动机喷油器板和turhopump。
f - 1推力室和钎焊炉。
f - 1测试站。
f - 1发动机生产线。
半人马阶段和两个rl 10引擎。
rl 10发动机细节和系统;发动机集群安装在年代iv阶段土星的我。
j 2引擎的细节、系统组装和测试。
土星年代iv阶段。
生产的照片S-IVB七个阶段。
比较S-IVB阶段的土星IB和V。
S-IVB舞台展示和测试。
年代集成电路阶段土星V运载火箭。
5照片皮肤制造的年代集成电路阶段。
6张照片的组装和测试的年代集成电路阶段。
七张照片加工和组装的工艺阶段的销售。
在肯尼迪的任务控制中心。
圣- 124惯性制导平台。
仪��装置具体、系统,和组装。
沃纳·冯·布劳恩是听取了马赛厄斯西贝。
土星项目主要网站。
土星的承包商。
两个组织图的土星V程序。
照片的亚瑟鲁道夫。
美国国家航空航天局载人航天飞行办公室管理委员会。
载人航天飞行意识程序。
所有的照片的土星V程序控制中心。
年代集成电路在其所有飞行阶段运输车。
年代我舞台上它的运输车。
五张图片的NASA驳船船队。
四个照片的土星航空运输。
号点手推车。
土星运输设备。
三个视图的土星我测试飞行。
两种不同的观点对于土星飞马载荷我。
剖视图和两个视图的“土星运载火箭。
为- 501,第一次飞行准备土星V。
推出复杂39。
移动服务结构在LC 39。
阿波罗8号。
阿波罗11号在飞行;控制室发射后,宇航员埃德温·奥尔德林准备踏上月球苏【9127】ce;月球样品胸部。
阿波罗17号月球探险车。
共同的土星硬件。
两张照片的土星和太空实验室。
两个视图的土星和阿波罗-联盟测试任务。
四个照片阿拉巴马亨茨维尔的。